

751 N.Y.S.2d 854
 300 A.D.2d 370, 751 N.Y.S.2d 854, 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 09178
 (Cite as: 300 A.D.2d 370, 751 N.Y.S.2d 854)

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Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
 Second Department, New York.
 Daisy MASON, plaintiff-respondent,

v.

Erwin STOKES, defendant,
 Yaniv Homes, Inc., et al., appellants. (Matter No. 1)
 In the Matter of Daisy Mason, et al., petitioners,

v.

Clerk of the City Register, County of Kings,
 respondent. (Matter No. 2)

Dec. 9, 2002.

Warner & Scheuerman, New York, N.Y. (Jonathan
 D. Warner of counsel), for appellants.

****855** Frances Malloy (Brown & Brown,
 Brooklyn, N.Y. [Harry L. Brown and Ira Greene]
 of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.

***370** In an action pursuant to RPAPL article 15,
 inter alia, to determine claims to real property and
 a related proceeding pursuant to Real Property Law §
 329, inter alia, to cancel of record certain allegedly
 fraudulent deeds, which were joined for trial, the
 defendants Yaniv Homes, Inc., and Exotic Realty,
 Inc., appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme
 Court, Kings County (Held, J.), dated November
 15, 2001, which, inter alia, granted the motion of
 Daisy Mason, among other things, for summary
 judgment, and (2) an amended order of the same
 court, dated January 2, 2002, which, inter alia,
 granted the same relief.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order is
 dismissed, as the order was superseded by the
 amended order; and it is further,

ORDERED that the amended order is affirmed;
 and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the
 respondent Daisy Mason.

In 1968, property located at 65 Bond Street in
 Brooklyn was conveyed to Daisy Mason. By deed
 dated September 14, 1998, the property purportedly

was transferred by Mason to Erwin Stokes. Stokes
 subsequently conveyed the property to the appellant
 Yaniv Homes, Inc., which, in turn, transferred the
 property to the appellant Exotic Realty, Inc., a
 related entity.

The plaintiff commenced this action and
 proceeding, among other things, to have the deeds
 canceled of record, claiming that her signature on
 the deed to Stokes was a forgery. She moved for
 summary judgment and, in opposition to the motion,
 the appellants claimed that she was not, in fact, the
 Daisy Mason who owned the property, but rather an
 imposter named Pearl Mason, and, therefore, she
 lacked standing to challenge the deed.

The plaintiff established her entitlement to
 summary ***371** judgment. In opposition to the
 motion, the appellants failed to submit probative
 evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact (
see Rifenburg v. Wilczek, 294 A.D.2d 653,
 654-655, 741 N.Y.S.2d 605; *Matter of Fisch v.*
Aiken, 252 A.D.2d 556, 675 N.Y.S.2d 885). In
 fact, some of the evidence submitted by the
 appellants confirmed that the plaintiff, who is also
 known as Pearl Mason, is Daisy Mason, the record
 owner of the property until it was fraudulently
 transferred to Stokes. Consequently, the Supreme
 Court properly granted the motion.

ALTMAN, J.P., S. MILLER, LUCIANO and
 RIVERA, JJ., concur.

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